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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(j) (case transferred from the Supreme Court). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the district court's finding that plaintiff was a partner in Access Auto 
with defendant Ali Ghaffarian is clearly erroneous? (Issue preserved in the Record, R-
1291 at 338:11-342:17). 
Standard of Review: "With respect to mixed questions of law and fact, we will 
review the underlying facts under the deferential clear error standard; however, the legal 
effect of those facts is within the province of the appellate court, and 'no deference' need 
be given a lower court's resolution of such questions of law." McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 
941, 944 (Utah 1998.) 
II. Did the district court err in failing to address or agree with defendants' 
argument that plaintiffs claims are barred by the four year statute of limitations, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25? (Issue preserved in the Record, R-1292 at 508:12-510:10). 
Standard of Review: The applicability of a statute of limitations is a question 
of law which is reviewed for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002). 
III. Did the district court err in awarding rental value and prejudgment interest as 
damages under Utah Code Ann. § 48-4-39? (Issue preserved in the Record at R-l 113, 
1115-17). 
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Standard of Review: Challenge of conclusion of law underlying trial court's 
order is not accorded any deference, but is reviewed for correctness. Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
PERTINENT STATUTES 
Resolution of this case necessarily involves application of the following Utah Code 
provisions: 
48-1-39. Rights of retiring or estate of deceased partner when the 
business is continued. 
When any partner retires or dies and the business is continued under 
any of the conditions set forth in Section 48-1-38(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), or 
Section 48-l-35(2)(b) without any settlement of accounts as between 
him or his estate and the person or partnership continuing the business, 
unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representatives as against such 
persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of 
dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an 
amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership 
with interest, or, at his option or at the option of his legal 
representatives, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use of 
his right in the property of the dissolved partnership; provided, that the 
creditors of the dissolved partnership as against the separate creditors or 
the representatives of the retired or deceased partner shall have priority 
on any claim arising under this section, as provided by Section 48-1-
38(8). 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon 
an instrument in writing.... 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Final Amended Judgment entered by the district court 
following a two-day bench trial on the issue of whether plaintiff/appellee Hassan 
Mardanlou ("Mardanlou") entered into an oral partnership agreement with 
defendants/appellants (the "Ghaffarians") to operate a used car business under the name 
"Access Auto." (R-1221-24). This case was first tried in part before Judge Henriod on 
July 13, 2000. After the first day of trial, the parties entered into a settlement in open 
court, upon which judgment was entered on August 15, 2000. (R-1288 at pp. 196-98). 
The Ghaffarians filed a Motion to Set Aside Settlement on August 14, 2000. (R-l 82-87). 
Judge Henriod recused himself and an evidentiary hearing on that motion was held before 
Judge Dever on March 20, 2001. (R-1289). Judge Dever granted the motion and entered 
an order setting aside the judgment on April 13, 2001, finding that defendants' settlement 
"was not the product of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent conclusion." (R-383). 
The case was then tried before Judge Dever on October 15, 16, and 17, 2002. (R-
1290-92). On October 18, 2002, Judge Dever announced his findings and conclusions 
from the bench. (R-1292 at pp. 517-19). Judge Dever found that (1) the inclusion of both 
Access Auto and Mardanlou's business, M&M Motors, on a property lease agreement 
and an insurance document supported the inference of a partnership; (2) Mr. Ghaffarian 
referred to Mr. Mardanlou as his "partner"; (3) Mr. Mardanlou ordered business cards for 
Access Auto containing both his and Mr. Ghaffarian's first names on the card; (4) Mr. 
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Mardanlou worked at the car lot while Mr. Ghaffarian purchased the vehicles; and (5) Mr. 
Mardanlou wrote checks on the M&M Motors account to pay for furniture and other 
expenses benefitting Access Auto. (Id.) 
Based on these findings, Judge Dever ruled that Mr. Mardanlou was a partner in 
Access Auto with Mr. Ghaffarian, that Mr. Ghaffarian had appropriated partnership 
property by purchasing the property that was the subject of the lease agreement (the 
"Property") solely in his own name, and ordered the Ghaffarians to deed one-half of the 
Property to Mardanlou, subject to further hearing to apportion the debt incurred in 
connection with the Property. (R-931-36). 
An evidentiary hearing was held by the district court on April 3, 2003, pursuant to 
defendants' Motion for Limited New Trial. (R-1293 at pp. 15-111). On July 22, 2003, 
the district court issued Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Memorandum Decision and Order (R-1078), after which the defendants filed a Motion to 
Amend and Objections on August 13, 2003 (R-l 110), which Motion the district court 
granted in part and denied in part by its Order dated April 20, 2004 (R-l 197). 
The district court entered its final Amended Judgment on September 17, 2004, in 
which it ordered the defendants to transfer by deed to plaintiff an undivided one-half 
interest in the real property "known as Access Auto." (R-1221-23). The interest to be 
transferred to plaintiff Mardanlou is "subject to an equitable lien in favor of Defendants, 
reflecting the obligation of Plaintiff to pay Defendants one-half the $663,414.90 amount 
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that Defendant advanced towards the Property" after November 7, 1997 through June 14, 
2004, for mortgage payments, insurance, property taxes, improvements and interest. (Id.) 
The court also found that the Ghaffarians' interest in the Property was subject to an 
equitable lien in favor of Mr. Mardanlou, in the amount of one half the Court-determined 
$83,500 annual rental value from November 7, 1997 until the date of judgment, plus 
interest. The court dismissed all remaining claims with prejudice. (Id.) 
The Ghaffarians filed their Notice of Appeal on October 13, 2004. (R-1225). 
Mardanlou filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on October 25, 2004. (R-1246). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants Ali Ghaffarian and his spouse, Nasrin Faezi Ghaffarian formed Access 
Auto in July 1989. (R-1291 at pp. 247:21-23). The bond required to operate an 
automobile dealership in Utah was issued in the name of Nasrin Ghaffarian. Ali 
Ghaffarian obtained the required licenses to purchase and sell cars for Access Auto, and 
Ali and Nasrin Ghaffarian opened a joint bank account for Access Auto with First 
Security Bank at that time (R-1291 at p. 250:6-12). 
Appellee Hassan Mardanlou formed M&M Janitorial Service in 1986, which he 
operated with his brother until he allegedly formed M&M Motors in 1989. (R-1290 at pp. 
26:29-29:6).l Through M&M Motors, Mardanlou testified that he was a "wholesaler" 
1
 The Utah State Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division reported that "Mr. 
Mardanlou is not, nor has he ever been, licensed as a Motor Vehicle Dealer in the State of 
Utah during the years 1998 to date." (Defendants' Trial Exh. 13). Nor was the Division 
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who purchased vehicles from auto auctions, "fixed them up" and then sold the vehicles to 
a dealer or another auto auction. (R-1290 at p. 29:10-15). 
Mardanlou testified that during a trip to California to purchase vehicles at auction, 
he and Ghaffarian discussed the possibility of "getting together" in the auto business. (R-
1290 at p. 31:5-16). When a car lot location became available at 3960 State Street, the 
parties discussed the possibility of sharing the rent and other expenses to operate their 
separate businesses from that location. (R-1290 at p. 32:1-14; R-1291 at p. 444:23-25). 
Mr. Mardanlou contends that the parties originally intended that he leave M&M Motors 
"to become a partner with Ali as Access Auto." (R-1291 at p. 38:14-16). The 
Ghaffarians recall the arrangement differently. Nasrin Ghaffarian testified that "Access 
Auto was going to operate as Access Auto and M&M Motors was operating as M&M 
Motors . . . Hassan was going to sell his cars and Ali was going to sell Access Auto cars." 
(R-1291 at pp. 423:19-424:1). Mr. Ghaffarian testified that the purpose of his 
arrangement with Mr. Mardanlou was to share certain costs, including rent and insurance, 
while operating as "two different dealerships." (R-1291 at p. 453:19-20). "Both 
companies would sell cars from the State Street location, I helped him, he helped me. I 
sold his cars; he sold my cars and we helped each other." (R-1291 at pp. 275:14-276:12). 
able to locate any record of a license for M&M Motors. (Id.) Although Mr. Mardanlou 
produced copies of documents that he contends support his claim that he was licensed, he 
never produced a Utah dealer certificate. (R-1291 at pp. 467:9-468:10; 470:8-12). 
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On November 5, 1991, "M&M Motors, Inc. and Access Auto, Inc." executed a 
lease agreement with Cline Dahle Investments to rent the property at 3960-3964 South 
State Street in Salt Lake County (the "Property"). (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 1). Mr. 
Ghaffarian paid the $6,000 for the first and last month's rent required when the lease was 
signed. (R-1290 at p. 35:16-19).2 Mr. Mardanlou paid $2,000 for furniture and 
equipment. (R-1290 at p. 35:17-19). The Lease Agreement was for a one-year term, with 
an option to renew the lease for one additional year, and an option to purchase the 
Property at the end of the lease term for $365,000. Both men signed the lease on behalf 
of their respective companies on November 15, 1991. (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 1). 
In addition to planning on sharing the costs of the Property, Mr. Ghaffarian 
contacted his insurance agent to ask whether there was "a way to combine [their separate 
policies] so that the two men could purchase a single policy that" would "cover both" 
companies. (R-1290 at pp. 197:1-199:14). When asked at trial whether the parties 
"represented that they were partners in this business", the insurance agent testified that he 
did not hear "either one of them say that we are partners". (Id.) The agent confirmed that 
he was instructed to obtain coverage for both Access Auto and M&M Motors because 
Mr. Mardanlou "wanted to make sure" to "maintain M&M Motors on the policy." (R-
1290 at pp. 200:8-201:9). The agent testified that when he talked to "Farmers, they would 
2
 The district court incorrectly held in its oral findings after the trial on October 
18, 2002, that "[tjhere was payment by the plaintiff for the first and last months' rent at 
the time of the signing of the lease." (R-1292 at p. 518: 5-7). Plaintiff conceded this 
error (R-878), and it was omitted from the written Findings. (R-931). 
7 
not allow us to do it with - where it would state Access Auto and M&M Motors and so 
the only way we could do that, issue that policy," was to "list both individuals and list it 
asaDBL." (R-1290atpp. 199:15-201:9). The agent confirmed that as of December 18, 
1991, Mr. Mardanlou insisted on maintaining insurance coverage for M&M Motors. (R-
1290 at pp. 205:19-207:13). (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 4). 
Although the parties shared the same location and provided services on behalf of 
each other's business, they maintained separate bank accounts and accounting. Access 
Auto maintained a checking account (0540030137) at First Security Bank (R-1291 at p. 
434:1-7). Mr. Mardanlou was not an authorized signator on the Access Auto account, nor 
did he ever have access to the bank account statements. (R-129 at pp. 107:18-108:11; R-
1291 at p. 435:7-15). Mr. Mardanlou maintained account no. 2721148014 in the name of 
M&M Motors at First Security Bank until "the end of 1992." (R-1290 at p. 43:11-13). 
Those account statements indicated he had a balance of $2,683.10 in November 1991 and 
$45.94 in December 1991. (Defendant's Trial Exh. 5). 
Mr. Mardanlou testified that he focused his efforts on "running the car lot" while 
Ali was "in charge of buying the vehicles." (R-1290 at p. 38:2-21). Mr. Mardanlou 
claims that he wrote checks on the M&M Motors account in the amount of $31,000 to pay 
for "parts and labor" to repair vehicles sold by both Access Auto and M&M Motors. (R-
1290 at pp. 41:19-43:5; Plaintiffs Exhibit 2). He later admitted under cross-examination, 
however, that he received checks from Access Auto payable to "M&M Motors" that 
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exceeded the amount he paid toward repairs on Mr. Ghaffarian's cars. (R-1290 at pp. 
87:2-88:16, 153:11-156:18; Defendants'Trial Exh. 1). The payments from Access Auto 
to M&M Motors were more than sufficient to reimburse plaintiff for the $2,000 furniture 
he allegedly purchased (R-1290 at p. 35:19-22) and to pay for the employee salaries he 
claims to have paid. (R-1290 at pp. 153:12-156:18). 
Mr. Mardanlou purchased cars for M&M Motors "up until the end of 1992." (R-
1290 at p. 82:6-14). Because M&M Motors only sold vehicles wholesale, it's cars were 
sold to retail customers through Access Auto. Upon the sale of an M&M Motors vehicle, 
Mr. Ghaffarian would pay M&M Motors with an Access Auto check. (R-1290 at pp. 
99:17-102:15). 
Although M&M Motors and Access Auto continued to operate as separate 
businesses with separate bank accounts through 1992, it soon became apparent that Mr. 
Mardanlou's auto business was almost non-existent. (R-1291 at pp. 451:7-454:6). He 
had no money to pay for rent, utilities, or to buy cars. (Id.) The " 15 to 20 cars" that he 
told Mr. Ghaffarian were coming from Idaho never materialized. (R-1291 at pp. 453:14-
454:6). Mr. Mardanlou reluctantly admitted under cross examination that the Ghaffarians 
were contributing "the vast part of the money" to purchase cars. (R-1290 at pp. 79:3-4; 
83:6-9). 
Mr. Mardanlou contended at trial that his failure to contribute any money towards 
the rent or the purchase of cars is explained by the fact that he contributed his time 
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"getting everything done at Access Auto while Ali [was] in charge of buying the 
vehicles". (R-1290 at p. 87:5-12). He was forced to admit, however, that he received a 
$10,000 payment by Mr. Ghaffarian in March of 1993 to compensate him for his 
assistance on Access Auto matters. (R-1290 atpp. 87:12-88:19; 48:7-9). The 
Mardanlous reported that payment on their 1993 tax return as an "employee wage bonus 
rather than some sort of profit sharing." (R-1291 atpp. 235:17-236:1; 96:24-98:3). Mr. 
Mardanlou went on the Access Auto payroll in April 1993 (R-1290 at pp. 90:3-14; 139:4-
11) and continued to receive two payroll checks each month until he left Access Auto in 
November of 1997. (Id.) He claims that Mr. Ghaffarian's accountant told him that he 
could be paid as an employee and still be a partner. (R-1290 at p. 117:18-25). The 
accountant testified that he has no recollection of such a conversation. (R-1291 at p. 
382:13-19). 
Mr. Mardanlou's spouse has been employed by the IRS for 25 years and under IRS 
employee rules knew she was obligated to "file timely and correct tax returns." (R-1291 
at p. 230:11-23). The Mardanlous5 filed a joint personal tax return for the year ending 
December 31, 1992, in which they listed "M&M Motors" as a sole proprietorship with 
gross receipts of $45,458. (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 6). Mr. Mardanlou also took the benefit 
of over $42,000 in losses for M&M Motors on his personal tax returns for 1991 and 1992, 
a valuable tax advantage that was not used to reduce the tax liability of Access Auto, the 
company in which he claims to have become a partner in 1991. (R-1291 at pp. 233:21-
10 
234:7). The Mardanlous never once reflected a partnership "share or return for Access 
Auto" on their tax returns for the years 1992 through 1997, the period during which Mr. 
Mardanlou claims he was a partner in Access Auto. (R-1291 at pp. 237:24-238:5; 
Plaintiffs Exh. 6). 
Mr. Mardanlou "explains" his failure to correctly report partnership income on his 
personal tax returns for the years 1991 through 1997, by claiming that he was waiting for 
Mr. Ghaffarian to "do the taxes partnership with me." (R-1290 at p. 117:12-25). Mr. 
Mardanlou claims that he approached Mr. Ghaffarian in April 1992 "about filing a 
partnership return." (R-1290 at pp. 113:16-117:25). Mr. Ghaffarian allegedly told him 
that he had to do his "own taxes first, then we can get together and do our partnership." 
(R-1290 at pp. 114:25-115:2). Mardanlou claims that although Ghaffarian refused to "do 
partnership taxes" with him in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, he just kept filing tax 
returns as an employee of Access Auto and assumed that he would one day work out his 
"partnership taxes" with Mr. Ghaffarian. (R-1290 at p. 118:4-17). The Ghaffarians' joint 
1991 federal tax returns were prepared on August 12, 1992 (Defendants' Trial Exh. 22) 
and their 1992 returns were timely filed in April 1993. (Defendants' Trial Exh. 23; R-
1291 at p. 282:9-12). Those tax returns report Access Auto as a "sole proprietorship" 
with Ali Ghaffarian listed as the "proprietor". (Defendants' Trial Exh. 22-22). 
Mr. Mardanlou has no recollection of participating in the negotiations to renew the 
lease after the term of the original lease that he signed expired in November 1992. (R-
11 
1290 at 108:11-25). Mardanlou alleges that "Ali, without the permission or knowledge of 
Hassan, by himself, exercised the option contained in the lease" in November 1993. (R-
132; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 7). At first, Mr Mardanlou admitted that he became "aware 
that Ali had exercised the option . . . approximately 6 months later" in May 1994. (R-
132). He later testified that he did not discover that fact until "late 1994, early 1995." R-
1290 at p. 64:2-5). 
During the six years that Mr. Mardanlou claims he was a "partner" in Access Auto, 
he never once "participated in deciding what Ali's payroll or take from the company was" 
(R-1290 at p. 142:20-24), and he admitted that Mr. Ghaffarian unilaterally determined his 
"draw" from the business without Mr. Mardanlou's "involvement." (R-1290 at pp. 
142:20-143:3). He had no access to the Access Auto check ledger, bank account 
statements, or mail box. (R-1290 at pp. 107:18-108:10). Not a single supplier or other 
business associate of Access Auto appeared at trial to testify that they heard Mr. 
Mardanlou refer to himself as a partner or owner of Access Auto. (R-1290 at pp. 102:20-
103:12). Mr. Mardanlou never paid any money towards rent of the Property nor for any 
of its subsequent mortgage payments, nor did he pay for any of the Property taxes or 
insurance. (R-1293 at pp. 38:24 to 39:2). 
On a W-4 form submitted to the IRS, Mr. Mardanlou swore under penalty of 
perjury that he was an "employee" of Access Auto. (Defendants' Exhibit 11; R-1290 at 
pp. 162:3-163:12). He also signed a credit service subscriber agreement as the "manager" 
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of Access Auto with Mr. Ghaffarian signing as the "subscriber" or owner. (Defendants5 
Trial Exh. 14; R-1290 at pp. 170:1-171:20). When submitting a loan application to First 
Security Bank, Mr. Mardaniou listed himself as the "manager" of Access Auto and 
designated "Ali" (Mr. Ghaffarian) as his "supervisor". (Defendants' Trial Exh. 17; R-
1290 at pp. 176:4-178*2). A mechanic employed by Access Auto testified that during his 
three years with the company, whenever someone came into the business asking to see the 
"owner", Mr. Mardaniou would "either send them to Ali or tell them Ali wasn't there." 
(R-1291 at pp. 346:24-347:12). Similarly, the windshield supplier for Access Auto 
testified that Mr. Mardaniou would never purchase a replacement windshield without first 
obtaining approval from Mr. Ghaffarian. (R-1291 at pp. 405:12-406:9). 
Mr. Mardaniou testified that he decided to leave Access Auto in 1997 when Mr. 
Ghaffarian again refused his request to file partnership tax returns. (R-1290 at pp. 
111:15-112:20). On November 6, 1998, one year after he quit working for Access Auto, 
Mardaniou filed his Complaint in this action against Ghaffarian, Ghaffarian's spouse, 
Nasrin Faezi-Ghaffarian, and Access Auto, alleging that he was not an employee of 
Access Auto but that he was Mr. Ghaffarian's partner, and asserted claims for breach of 
partnership, fraud, and misrepresentation. (R-l). The defendants denied that Mardaniou 
was ever a partner with the Ghaffarians or Access Auto. (R-22). 
The case was tried before the Honorable L.A. Dever of the Third District Court, 
without a jury, on October 16-18, 2002. (R-1290-92). On October 18, 2002, Judge Dever 
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announced his findings and conclusions from the bench. (R-129 at pp. 517-19). 
Thereafter, on November 7 and 27, 2002, defendants filed Objections and Motions under 
Rules 50 and 52 challenging the court's rulings, and on January 9, 2003, filed a Rule 59 
Motion for Limited New Trial. (R-643, 654). Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and a non-final Judgment was entered by the district court on February 4, 2003. 
(R-931, 936). The Final Amended Judgment was entered on September 17, 2004. ® at 
1221). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A business relationship does not qualify as a "partnership" under Utah law unless 
the parties agree to share in the profits and control of the enterprise. Bassett v. Baker, 
530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974). Even if the parties believe they have a partnership or use the 
words "partnership" or "joint venture" in their discussions or agreements, a partnership 
will not be found "if the elements" of profit sharing and mutual control "are missing". 
Betenson v. Call Auto, 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982). Here, Ali Ghaffarian and Hassan 
Mardanlou agreed to enter into a cost sharing arrangement and to provide certain services 
to each other's company that were reimbursed to their respective bank accounts. While 
Mr. Mardanlou.and his friend testified that Mr. Ghaffarian referred to this relationship as 
a "partnership", the facts are undisputed that Mr. Ghaffarian never shared the profits of 
Access Auto with Mr. Mardanlou. 
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After it became apparent that Mr. Mardanlou's business (M&M Motors) was 
failing, Mr. Mardanlou became an employee of Access Auto and started receiving payroll 
checks in April 1993. For nearly five years, from April 1993 through November 1997, 
Mardanlou worked as an employee of Access Auto. He was paid a salary that he reported 
as wages on his tax returns; he never asked for any partnership draws or profits; he made 
no objection while the Ghaffarians drew funds from the business without his input or 
involvement; he represented himself as an "employee" of Access Auto on bank loan 
applications, tax forms and to suppliers; he took no action for more than five years after 
Mr. Ghaffarian refused his alleged requests for a partnership reconciliation so that his 
wife (who worked for the IRS) could file tax returns that accurately reflected Mr. 
Mardanlou's alleged partnership interest; and he was not a signatory on the Access Auto 
bank account and never had access to the bank account statements or the Access Auto 
mail box. Based on these admitted facts, the district court's finding that Mr. Mardanlou 
was a "partner" in Access Auto is both clearly erroneous and incorrect under the dual 
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact. See, Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1974) (reversing trial court's finding of a joint venture where the business 
arrangement did not involve a sharing of profits or the "mutual right to control"); McKay 
v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah 1988) (district court's findings of underlying facts 
reviewed for clear error; application of facts to law are afforded no deference but are 
reviewed for correctness). 
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The district court also erred by refusing to consider the defendants' statute of 
limitations defense. Mr. Mardanlou testified that beginning in April of 1992, he asked 
Mr. Ghaffarian for a partnership reconciliation so that Mr. Mardanlou's wife could file 
tax returns reflecting Mr. Mardanlou's alleged partnership interest in Access Auto. Mr. 
Ghaffarian refused that request and all subsequent requests made by Mr. Mardanlou from 
1992 to 1997. As an IRS employee, Mrs. Mardanlou understood the serious 
consequences of Mr. Ghaffarian's alleged refusal to produce the partnership information 
that her husband required in order to file accurate tax returns in 1992 through 1997. Yet 
the Mardanlous did not file this claim until November 1998, more than six years after Mr. 
Ghaffarian allegedly refused to provide them with that information. 
While this delay in filing strongly suggests that Mr. Mardanlou did not believe he 
was a partner in Access Auto until discussing the matter with an attorney in 1998, it is not 
necessary to reach the merits of his oral partnership claim in order to conclude that his 
cause of action accrued more than four years before he filed that claim in November 
1998. The four-year statute of limitations for breach of an oral agreement "begins to run 
upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action". See, 
Russell Packard Development v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^ f 20 (2005)(internal quotations 
omitted). That occurred when Mr. Ghaffarian allegedly refused Mr. Mardanlou's 
repeated requests for a partnership reconciliation and treated Mr. Ghaffarian as a salaried 
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employee, not an equal owner. Having acquiesced in that conduct for more than seven 
years, Mr. Mardanlou's claim for breach of an oral partnership agreement is time-barred. 
Finally, the district court erred in awarding damages based on the post dissolution 
rental value of the property. When a partner leaves the partnership and the business is 
continued, Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-39 provides for the recovery of the value of the 
departing partner's "interest in the dissolved partnership" plus "interest" on that amount. 
"In lieu of interest", the departing partner may elect "the profits attributable to the use of 
his right in the property". 
Mr. Mardanlou is not entitled to interest because the court never "ascertained . . . 
[the] amount equal to the value of his interest." (Id.) Instead of awarding monetary 
damages "equal to the value" of Mr. Mardanlou's interest in Access Auto, the district 
court ordered the Ghaffarians to "transfer by deed" to Mr. Mardanlou a one-half interest 
in the Property. Monetary interest is not available where no "amount" is ascertained upon 
which the interest can be calculated. 
Similarly, Mr. Mardanlou is not entitled to "profits attributable to the use of his 
right in the property of the dissolved partnership" because he offered no evidence of the 
post dissolution profits "attributable" to the use of that property. The district court erred 
by awarding damages based on the alleged rental value of the property. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS A PARTNER IN ACCESS AUTO AUTO 
Two different standards of review apply to the district court's ruling that Mr. 
Mardanlou was a partner with Mr. Ghaffarian in Access Auto. "With respect to mixed 
questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying facts under the deferential clear 
error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the 
appellate court, and 'no deference' need be given a lower court's resolution of such 
questions of law." McKay v. Hardy. 973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah 1998). 
While the burden on a party challenging factual findings under the clearly 
erroneous standard is a heavy one, that burden is satisfied here because the undisputed 
facts establish that the relationship between Mr. Mardanlou and Mr. Ghaffarian did not 
satisfy the elements of a partnership or joint venture. The district court's finding of a 
legal partnership should also be reversed under the "correctness" standard of review 
because the "legal effect" of the underlying facts found by the district court is at most an 
agreement to share costs, not an agreement to share profits and control - required 
elements in establishing a partnership under Utah law. 
The elements of a joint venture or partnership under Utah law include the 
following: 
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The parties must combine their property, money, effects, skill, labor and 
knowledge. As a general rule, there must be a community of interest in 
the performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary interest in 
the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share in the 
profits, and unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a duty to share 
in any losses which may be sustained. 
Bassett v. Baker. 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added). 
The parties' characterization of their relationship as a "joint venture" or 
"partnership" is not determinative. Rogers v. Bitner, 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987). 
Even if the parties believe they have a partnership or use the words "partnership" or "joint 
venture" in their discussions or agreements, a partnership will not be found "if the 
elements . . . are missing." Betenson v. Call Auto, 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982). Here, 
two "essential elements" for establishing a partnership or joint venture are lacking: there 
is no evidence that Mr. Mardanlou had (1) the right to share profits in Access Auto, or (2) 
the mutual right to control that company. 
A. MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT COURT'S 
FINDING THAT MARDANLOU AND GHAFFARIAN WERE PARTNERS IN 
ACCESS AUTO 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that "[a] party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Marshaling entails "listing all the evidence supporting the finding 
that is challenged" and then demonstrating that the "marshaled evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light 
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most favorable to the decision." Judge Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate 
Review: Revised, 12 Utah J. 8, 13 (1999). The evidence supporting the district court's 
finding of a partnership is listed below. Sections B and C explain why the district court's 
factual findings are clearly erroneous. Sections D and E analyze why the district court 
erred as a matter of law in concluding that the "legal effect of those facts" is to create a 
partnership. 
Mr. Ghaffarian and Mr. Mardanlou executed a lease agreement on behalf of their 
respective companies on November 5, 1991. (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 1; R-1290 at p. 33:23-
11). The lease was executed in the name of "M & M Motors, Inc. and Access Auto, Inc. . 
. . as lessee." (Id.) Mr. Mardanlou testified that after the lease was signed, Mr. Ghaffarian 
shook his hand and said "we are in this together, partner." (R-1290 at p. 55:7-11). 
Mr. Mardanlou paid $2,000 for furniture and equipment that remained at Access 
Auto when he terminated his relationship with that company in 1997. (R-1290 at p. 
35:19-25). He also wrote two checks from M & M Motors in early 1992 to pay the wages 
of an Access Auto employee and possibly a few others at that time. (R-1290 at pp. 
134:14-137:17 Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 14). Mr. Mardanlou brought a total of five cars with 
him when he started working with Mr. Ghaffarian at the 3960 South State Street location. 
(R-1290 at pp. 39:24-40:6). The proceeds from the sale of those cars were deposited into 
the M & M Motors account that he claimed paid for repairs on vehicles sold by both M & 
M Motors and Access Auto. (R-1290 at pp. 42:2-43:20; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 2 and 3). 
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The parties also asked Mr. Ghaffarian's agent about obtaining an insurance policy 
in the names of "Ali Ghaffarian & Hassan Mardanlou Access Auto DBA: M & M 
Motors". (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 4; R-1290 at pp. 40:10-41:6). The insurance agent 
testified that he "formed the assumption" that Ali and Sam were partners. (R-1290 at pp. 
40:7-41:13). Business cards were purchased with the name "Access Auto" on the top and 
"Ali" and "Sam" underneath. (Plaintiffs Trial Exh.5; R-1290 at pp. 36:14-37:22). 
Mr. Mardanlou testified that when he first learned Mr. Ghaffarian exercised the 
lease option to purchase the car lot, Mr. Ghaffarian told him not to worry, "we are still 
partners, there's nothing going to happen between us." (R-1290 at pp. 64:2-65:8). Mr. 
Mardanlou testified that Mr. Ghaffarian allegedly explained that he purchased the lot in 
his own name because he did not want the transaction to "interfere" with Mr. 
Mardanlou's efforts to obtain a home mortgage. (R-1290 at p. 64:14-21). Mr. 
Mardanlou's witness, Hashem Farr, a mutual "friend" of Mr. Mardanlou and Mr. 
Ghaffarian, testified that he was present when Mr. Mardanlou raised this issue and heard 
Mr. Ghaffarian say "don't worry about that. . . we're partners." (R-1291 at pp. 322:24-
323:14). Mr. Farr testified that both men told him "they had combined the business 
together and they were going into real business together as partners." (R-1291 at p. 
320:3-10). Another friend of Mr. Mardanlou testified that Mr. Mardanlou told him that 
he was going to join Mr. Ghaffarian in a "partnership". (R-1290 at p. 217:1-5). 
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Mr. Mardanlou ran the car lot while Mr. Ghaffarian purchased vehicles at auction. 
(R-1290 at pp. 38:10-39:23). Mr. Mardanlou sold the cars from the lot and handled the 
financing paperwork. Id. Mr. Mardanlou received $10,000 from Mr. Ghaffarian in 
March of 1993 that he believed was his share in profits from the business. (R-1290 at p. 
48:5-20). Based on this evidence, the district court found that Mr. Mardanlou and Mr. 
Ghaffarian were partners in Access Auto. 
B. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT THE 
PARTIES DID NOT INTEND TO SHARE THE PROFITS OF ACCESS AUTO. 
"Profits" are defined as "the excess of returns over expenditures in a transaction or 
series of transactions." Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Assoc, 642 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 
1982). Where there is no direct testimony in the record of an agreement to share profits 
such an agreement may be inferred from the "actions taken by the parties." See, Rogers v. 
Bitner, 738 P.2d at 1032 ("a joint venture does not always arise pursuant to a formal 
agreement; rather it is a relationship voluntarily entered by the parties and all may be 
proven by the actions taken by the parties."). The parties' "actions" in this case prove that 
there was never an agreement or understanding between the parties to share profits in 
Access Auto. 
Plaintiff admitted that during the six years he claimed to be a partner, Mr. 
Ghaffarian and his wife decided what their "draw" from Access Auto would be without 
any input from the plaintiff. (R-1290 at pp. 142:2-143:2). Plaintiff simply accepted the 
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salary determined by Mr. Ghaffarian and never requested an accounting or even an 
explanation of how the supposed "profits" were being used. The $10,000 payment that 
plaintiff received in 1993 (which he now characterizes as a "profit" distribution) was in 
fact listed as an employee salary bonus on his tax return. (R-1290 at 97:2-98:3; Plaintiffs 
Trial Exh. 6). In fact, Mr. Mardanlou never once reflected a partnership "share or return 
for Access Auto" on his individual tax returns for the years 1992 through 1997. (R-1291 
at pp. 237:19-238:1; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 6). The actions of the parties prove that there 
was no agreement to share profits. 
Nor is there any evidence in the record of an express agreement to share profits. 
Mr. Mardanlou testified that Mr. Ghaffarian shook his hand and said, "We are in this 
together, Partner." (R-1290 at 55:7-11). But the mere use of the term "joint venture" or 
"partnership" to describe a business relationship is not sufficient to sustain a legal finding 
of partnership where there is no evidence of an agreement to share profits. See, cases 
cited infra at Section I.E. Similarly, the witness who testified on plaintiffs behalf that he 
heard Mr. Ghaffarian refer to plaintiff as his "partner" (R-1291 at pp. 322:24-323:17) 
later conceded that he never heard the parties discuss "how they were going to share or 
divide up profits." (R-1291 at p. 328:5-16). The lease agreement and insurance policy 
(Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 1 and 4) cited by the district court as evidence of a partnership are 
also silent on the issue of profit sharing. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has consistently reversed findings of "partnership" or 
"joint venture" where the profit sharing element is not satisfied. See, e.g., Vern Shutte & 
Sons v. J.R. Broadbent 24 Utah 2d 415, 473 P.2d 885 (Utah 1970) (reversing trial court's 
finding of a joint venture because the evidence did not establish that "the parties 
manifested by their conduct a desire to commingle their profits, control and risks in 
achieving the objective"); Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) (reversing trial 
court's finding of a joint venture because there was no evidence that the parties intended 
"to share losses as well as profits."); Betenson v. Call Auto Equipment Sales, 645 P.2d 
684 (Utah 1982) (reversing trial court's finding of a joint venture despite parties' use of 
that phrase in their agreement because "the elements of a joint venture" were not 
established). Here, the parties course of conduct over a six-year period establishes that 
the parties did not agree to share the profits of Access Auto. 
C. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT THE 
PARTIES DID NOT INTEND TO SHARE CONTROL OF ACCESS AUTO. 
Plaintiff consistently represented himself as an employee or manager of Access 
Auto. (102:20-103:12). He represented to the IRS and to a federally insured financial 
institution that AH Ghaffarian was his "supervisor" or "employer". (R-1290 at pp. 162:3-
163:12; 176:4-178:2; Defendants' Trial Exh. 11, 14 and 17). When customers or 
suppliers entered Access Auto and asked to see the owner, plaintiff referred them to Mr. 
Ghaffarian. (R-1291 at pp. 346:24-347:12). Plaintiffs own conduct over a six-year 
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period refutes his contention that he shared the right to "mutual control" over Access 
Auto with Mr. Ghaffarian. 
Plaintiff also conceded that he had no access to the Access Auto check ledgers and 
bank account statements nor was he even permitted access to the company mail box. (R-
1290 at pp. 107:18-108:10). He did not participate in the renewal of the property lease 
nor did he have any involvement in the preparation or filing of Access Auto's tax returns. 
(R-1290 at p. 152:20-22). Most importantly, he admitted that he never participated in 
"deciding what Ali's payroll or take from the company was". (R-1290 at pp. 142:20-
143:3). These admissions out of Mr. Mardanlou's own mouth demonstrate that an 
essential element in proving the existence of a partnership is lacking in this case. There is 
no evidence of an agreement granting Mr. Mardanlou a "mutual right to control" Access 
Auto. The district court's finding of "partnership or joint venture" is clearly erroneous. 
D. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS FOUND BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT ESTABLISHES AT MOST AN AGREEMENT TO SHARE 
COSTS. NOT AN AGREEMENT TO SHARE PROFITS AND LOSSES. 
The evidence relied upon by the district court supports Mr. Ghaffarian's testimony 
that the parties originally intended to share certain costs while operating M&M Motors 
and Access Auto as separate businesses. (R-1291 at p. 451:16-20). The legal effect of 
that evidence does not establish an agreement to operate a single partnership business 
under the name of Access Auto. Had that been the original intent, there would have been 
no need for the parties to execute the lease in the name of both Access Auto and M&M 
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Motors. (Plaintiff s Trial Exh. 1). Nor would the parties have instructed their insurance 
agent to "maintain M&M Motors on the policy." (R-1290 at p. 201:2-9). The inclusion 
of M&M Motors on the lease and the insurance policy proves that the parties intended to 
continue the operation of both entities, after they joined together to share costs in 
November 1991. 
The parties' agreement to "divide the labor" is also consistent with an arrangement 
between Access Auto and M&M Motors to operate as separate companies while sharing 
certain costs. Mr. Mardanlou testified that he was to "run" the car lot while "Ali is going 
to be in charge of buying the vehicles." (R-1290 at p. 38:6-39:3). Mardanlou admitted, 
however, that M&M Motors received a $10,000 check from the Access Auto account in 
March 1993, after which he went on the Access Auto payroll in April 1993. (R-1290 at 
pp. 87:12-88; 48:7-9; 90:3-14; 139:4-11). The fact that Mr. Mardanlou was paid for the 
services he provided to Access Auto proves that the arrangement was one of cost sharing-
-not partnership profit-sharing. 
Mardanlou also admitted that through 1992 (one year after he allegedly became a 
partner in Access Auto in November 1991) he continued to purchase cars in the name of 
M&M Motors. (R-1290 at p. 82:6-14). When those cars were sold through Access Auto, 
Mardanlou received checks from Access Auto which he deposited into the M&M Motors 
account. (R-1290 at 99:7-102:15). Again, the undisputed evidence that Mr. Ghaffarian 
was reimbursed for his vehicle sales is consistent with an agreement to share costs, not 
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profits. Moreover, Access Auto issued numerous other checks to M&M Motors in 1992 
that were more than sufficient to reimburse Mardanlou5s costs for the $2,000 in furniture 
and for the employee salaries he claims to have paid. (Defendant's Trial Exh. 1; R-1290 
at pp. 35, 87-88, 153-156). 
The district court also based its finding of a partnership on testimony that "Ali 
Ghaffarian represented to his friend, Hashem Farr, that plaintiff and he were partners." 
(R-1290 at p. 217:1-5; R-1291 at pp. 320:3-10; 322:25-17). Significantly, Mr. Fan-
admitted under cross-examination that he never heard plaintiff or Mr. Ghaffarian discuss 
"how they were going to share or divide profits." (R-1291 at p. 328:5-16). His testimony 
that he overheard statements by Mr. Ghaffarian that the parties intended to "combine their 
business together" as "partners" establishes at most an arrangement to share costs. Such 
an arrangement does not establish an agreement to share profits and control - essential 
elements of a partnership that are missing here. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
"the characterizations given by the parties are certainly not determinative of the issue" of 
whether a partnership exists. Rogers v. M.O. Bitnen 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987). 
The testimony of Hasem Farr is not sufficient to establish the existence of a partnership in 
the face of undisputed evidence that there was no agreement or intent for Mr. Mardanlou 
to share in the profits or control of Access Auto. The evidence relied upon by the district 
court does not, as a matter of law, support the conclusion that Mardanlou was a partner in 
Access Auto. 
27 
Nor does the creation of a business card including the names of "Sam" and "Ali" 
reflect an intent by the parties to create a partnership to share profits in Access Auto. 
(Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 5). Mardanlou testified that M&M Motors was in the "wholesale" 
business (R-1290 at p. 29:5-15) so he sold his cars through Access Auto. (R-1290 at p. 
41:19-22). However, all money received from the sale of M&M Motors' cars was 
deposited into the M&M Motors account. (R-1290 at pp. 41:19-42:4). That conduct is 
consistent with Mr. Ghaffarian's testimony that he and Mr. Mardanlou intended to 
operate their companies as separate businesses from a single location with separate 
accounting to reimburse each other for expenditures made or services provided. Had the 
parties intended for Mardanlou to leave M&M Motors "to become a partner with Ali as 
Access Auto", there would have been no need to deposit proceeds from the sale of M&M 
Motors' vehicles into the M&M account. The conduct of the parties in (1) maintaining 
separate bank accounts, (2) entering into a lease in the name of both companies, (3) 
reimbursing each other for expenditures made and services provided on each other's 
behalf proves that they did not intend to become partners in Access Auto. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF PARTNERSHIP IS CONTRARY TO 
UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS APPLYING PARTNERSHIP LAW TO 
AUTO DEALER RELATIONSHIPS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the use of the term "partner" or 
the sharing of facilities, advertising or other joint efforts by persons engaged in the auto 
sales business is not sufficient to support the legal conclusion of a partnership where there 
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is no evidence of mutual control or the sharing of profits. In Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 
165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952), the Court held that where two auto dealers Mid business from 
the same used car lot," referred to each other as "partner", and advertised "used cars" on a 
large sign containing both of their names, the dealers were not engaged in a joint venture 
or partnership because there was "no agreement, express or implied, for the sharing of 
profits." 239 P.2d at 752. Similar to this case, each dealer in Bates "had his own cars to 
sell, and when one of them sold a car belonging to the other, the one whose car was sold 
paid to the one who sold it a flat fee of $25, in contrast to sharing the profits." 239 P.2d 
at 751. The dealers also made money on each other's car sales in the form of financing 
charges. Id. Despite this mutually beneficial "working arrangement", the Utah Supreme 
Court held: 
To establish a joint adventure there must be an agreement, express or 
implied, for the sharing of profits. The relationship in this case is not 
one of joint adventure by virtue of the fact that [one partner] realized a 
profit in the form of a [financing charge on the sale of the other 
vehicles]. Profits gained by Simpson from the sale of the car and 
reserves earned by Saunders for financing the transaction are two 
different things. Sharing the lot, the building and the telephone does not 
constitute this working relationship between the two dealers a joint 
adventure. 
239P.2dat752. 
To the extent that Mardanlou and Ghaffarian sold vehicles for each other or 
provided other services, those sales and efforts were reimbursed. (87:2-88:16; 153:11-
156:17). As in Bates, the sharing of some costs and the appearance of both their names 
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on an advertising sign or card does not create a joint venture or partnership where there is 
no evidence of profit sharing. See also, Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, 645 
P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982) (reversing finding of a joint venture between an auto dealer 
and investors despite their "use of the words joint venture in a contract" because the 
elements of "a mutual right of control [and] a right to share in the profits" were not 
established). 
The Utah Supreme Court also rejected an oral partnership claim in Harmon v. 
Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979) where an auto dealer and one of his employees 
executed a letter of intent to "enter into formal agreements to effect" a partnership on 
specified terms. Although a formal agreement was never executed, the employee claimed 
that "the parties had an actual partnership in fact" based on (1) oral discussions; (2) the 
dealer's introduction of the employee "to others as his partner"; (3) a newspaper 
advertisement stating that the employee was "going to be made a partner"; (4) placement 
of the employee's name on the dealership's "draw account"; and (5) evidence that the 
employer allowed the employee to "hire and fire some employees". (596 P.2d at 637-38). 
As in this case, the employee also alleged that "he repeatedly requested Greenwood to 
consummate the paperwork to the partnership", but that Greenwood procrastinated, 
stating there was "no hurry". (Id.) 
In affirming the district court's finding that no partnership was created, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that the evidence of an agreement offered by the employee "is 
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woefully lacking in the requisite specificity required for judicial enforcement. . . where 
there was simply some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be entered in the 
future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of contract the parties ought have made and 
enforce it." 596 P.2d at 639. The Court also held that the employer's alleged agreement 
to "consummate the paperwork to the partnership" sometime in the future was not 
sufficient to support a finding of partnership where the employee "never received any 
profits from the . . . business, as would a partner." (Id.) 
Here, Mardanlou "never received any profits" from Access Auto. He was paid as 
an employee each year, a fact that he reported on his tax returns in 1992 through 1996. 
Mr. Mardanlou's testimony that Mr. Ghaffarian deferred his requests to "do partnership 
taxes" is at most evidence of "some nebulous notion that a contract might be entered in 
the future." As in Harmon, that evidence is "woefully lacking in the requisite specificity 
required for judicial enforcement" of a partnership. The district court's finding that Mr. 
Mardanlou was a partner in Access Auto is contradicted by the undisputed fact that he 
"never received any profits" from that business. The judgment awarding Mr. Mardanlou 
a one-half interest in the Access Auto property should be reversed with directions to enter 
judgment in favor of the Ghaffarians. 
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II. 
PLAINTIFF'S PARTNERSHIP CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The Ghaffarians alleged in their Answer to the Complaint that Mardanlou's claim 
for breach of the alleged oral partnership agreement is barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations set forth in Utah Code. Ann. § 78-12-25(1). (R-22). The Ghaffarians also 
argued that defense at trial. (R-1291 at pp. 508:12-510:10). Mardanlou ignored that 
argument and the district court made no findings regarding the statute of limitations 
defense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 provides that an action "not founded upon an 
instrument in writing" may be brought within four years. The district court found that the 
Ghaffarians breached an alleged oral partnership between "plaintiff and Ali Ghaffarian." 
(Conclusions of Law at ]f 1; R-1221). "A statute of limitations begins to run upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Russell Packard 
Development v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, Tf 20 (2005). Once a statute has begun to run, a 
plaintiff must file his or her claim before the limitations period expires or the claim will 
be barred. (Id.) Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action will neither prevent 
the running of the statute of limitations nor excuse a plaintiffs failure to file a claim 
within the relevant statutory period. (Id.) 
Here, Mardanlou's claim is based on the theory that he became a partner in Access 
Auto no later than November 5, 1991, when he executed the real property lease with Mr. 
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Ghaffarian. (See, Plaintiffs Trial Exh.l; R-1290 at p. 38:6-16). As a partner in Access 
Auto, Mr. Mardanlou would have been entitled to (1) an equal share of the profits, and (2) 
a "mutual right of control" in the affairs of the partnership. Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 
2 (Utah 1974). Yet, Mr. Mardanlou admitted at trial that he was denied these rights from 
the very beginning of his relationship with Mr. Ghaffarian in 1991. Mr. Mardanlou 
testified that because his wife worked for the IRS, it was important for him to file 
accurate and timely tax returns. In April 1992 he claims to have asked Mr. Ghaffarian to 
cooperate with him in the filing of a "partnership tax return" and Mr. Ghaffarian rejected 
that request. (R-1290 at 113:16-25). Mardanlou claimed that every year thereafter until 
1997 he asked Mr. Ghaffarian to file partnership returns and Mr. Ghaffarian "again 
refused to file any partnership returns." (R-1290 at pp. 117:12-118:17). When asked why 
he "didn't just break up the partnership" after Mr. Ghaffarian refused his repeated 
requests to file partnership returns, Mr. Mardanlou testified "basically, I took Ali's word 
for it that we are partners." (R-1290 at p. 118:4-12). While it strains credulity to suggest 
that Mr. Mardanlou knowingly risked the loss of his wife's job and criminal tax liability 
in reliance on Mr. Ghaffarian's alleged assurances that he would provide the partnership 
information later, his failure to file a claim for more than six years after his partner 
refused to provide him with critical tax information mandates dismissal of that claim 
under the applicable four year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1). 
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The partnership that was allegedly formed in November 1991 was also breached in 
numerous other ways that Mr. Mardanlou became aware of more than four years before 
this claim was filed in November 1998. As a party to the lease/option agreement, Mr. 
Mardanlou is deemed to have constructive knowledge of its terms, including the 
November 5, 1993 expiration date.3 See, e.g., Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 17 Utah 
2d 205, 407 P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 1965). That knowledge, combined with the fact that 
Access Auto continued to occupy the premises after the option expired without Mr. 
Mardanlou having participated in the option exercise, is more than sufficient to put Mr. 
Mardanlou on notice that the oral partnership agreement he allegedly entered into with 
Mr. Ghaffarian was breached. Accordingly, the four-year statute of limitations began to 
run no later than November 5, 1993. The filing of the Complaint on November 6, 1998 
was thus untimely. 
Mr. Mardanlou also testified that from the very beginning of his business 
relationship with Mr. Ghaffarian in November 1991, he was denied access to the Access 
3
 The lease was executed on November 5, 1991 with an option to renew for an 
additional term and an option to purchase at the "end of the term". (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 
1). Plaintiff originally stated he acquired actual knowledge that Mr. Ghaffarian 
purchased the property without his permission "approximately 6 months" after Mr. 
Ghaffarian exercised the option in November 1993. (R-132). At trial he testified that he 
did not "discover" Mr. Ghaffarian's exercise of the option until "late 1994, early 1995." 
(R-1290 at p. 64:2-5). Mr. Mardanlou's actual knowledge of the exercise is not relevant, 
however, because the four-year statute of limitations applicable to this action "begins to 
run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." 
Russell 2005 UT at ^ 20. That occurred when Mr. Ghaffarian exercised the option in 
November 1993 without Mr. Mardanlou's "permission". 
34 
Auto bank account statements, check ledger and company mail box. (R-1290 at pp. 
107:18-108:11). Similarly, as a partner with Mr. Ghaffarian, Mardanlou would have been 
entitled to share equally in the profits of Access Auto yet he admitted that he never 
"participated] in deciding what Ali's payroll or take from the company was." (R-1290 at 
pp. 142:20-143:3). All of these actions violate the oral partnership agreement that was 
supposedly formed in November 1991. Mr. Mardanlou's admission that he was denied 
these fundamental partnership rights from the very outset of his alleged "partnership" 
with Mr. Ghaffarian in November 1991, mandates the conclusion that the four-year 
statute of limitations period for breach of oral agreements expired years before Mr. 
Mardanlou filed his claim in November 1998. 
Although the plaintiff did not address the statute of limitations argument at trial, he 
may try to argue on appeal that the statute should be "equitably tolled" if he did not 
"become aware of the cause of action because of defendant's concealment or misleading 
conduct." (Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, Tf 25). However, application of the "discovery 
rule" to toll the running of the statute of limitations "requires a demonstration that the 
party seeking to exercise the rule has acted in a reasonable and diligent manner" (Id. at f^ 
26), this Court should rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs claim is barred by the four-
year statute of limitations based on Mr. Mardanlou's admissions that he was denied basic 
partnership rights from the beginning of his alleged partnership agreement with Mr. 
Ghaffarian in November 1991 and did not file this claim until November 1998. The 
35 
evidence in the record is more than sufficient for this Court to rule as a matter of law that 
Mr. Mardanlou "reasonably [should] have discovered the facts underlying a cause of 
action" more than four years before he filed his claim in November 1998. 
III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING POST 
DISSOLUTION RENTAL DAMAGES 
The district court found that the "only evidence" of damages offered by the 
plaintiff is an appraisal of the Property for $850,000, excluding mortgages. (R-1292 at p. 
496:18-25). The Court awarded the plaintiff a one-half interest in that Property (subject 
to existing mortgages and minus the expenses paid and the value of post dissolution 
expenses and improvements made by the Ghaffarians), plus one-half the Court-
determined $83,500 annual rental value of the Property . . . plus simple interest at the rate 
of 10% per annum from the first day of each month" until the date judgment was entered. 
(R-1221). 
The plaintiff first requested rental damages (for the period following his departure 
from Access Auto in November 1997) in his post-trial brief in opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for a Limited New Trial. (R-1009). The district court construed that request as 
an "election" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-39 "to receive his portion of the profits 
from the partnership property from the time of dissolution in lieu of interest from the time 
of dissolution." (R-1094). Section 48-1-39 provides: 
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When any partner retires or dies and the business is continued . . . 
without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the 
person or partnership continuing the business unless otherwise agreed, 
he or his legal representatives as against such persons or partnership may 
have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and 
shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his 
interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option . . . in 
lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right in the 
property of the dissolved partnership. (Emphasis added). 
The award of post dissolution rent is contrary to the express language of Section 
48-1-39 which limits recovery to either (1) "interest" on the value of the dissolved 
partnership or (2) "in lieu of interest... the profits attributable to the use of [the common 
partner's] right in the property of the dissolved partnership."4 Here, no interest was 
awarded because the district court did not award monetary damages based on the value of 
the property. Instead, the court ordered the Ghaffarians to transfer a one-half interest in 
the property to Mr. Mardanlou. Nor is Mardanlou entitled to the alternative remedy of 
"the profits attributable to the use of his right in the property," because he failed to offer 
any evidence of profits. See e^g., Parker v. Northern Mixing Co., 756 P.2d 881, fn. 24 
(Alaska 1988) (reversing an award of rental value damages on the ground that partner in 
possession of partnership property was not required to pay other partner rental value as 
damages). The district court erred by awarding post dissolution rental value and 
prejudgment interest on that amount. 
4Defendant preserved this argument for appeal at R-l 113, 1115-17. 
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The amount of the rent awarded to plaintiff for the five and a half year period 
November 1997 through March 2003 was also not supported by any competent evidence. 
The court found that the "reasonable annual rental value of for the property" for that 
period is $83,500. (R-1085). That figure was taken out of plaintiff s property appraisal 
for a different time period, 1992 through November 1997 (Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 8, at p. 
103), and from an appraisal that the court had indicated was "immaterial" since the court 
had decided to award half the Property instead of half of an appraised value of the 
Property. (R-1293 at p. 23:1-4). That rent amount was also grossly overstated for the 
many reasons explained by defendants' expert (R-813-814; R-1293 at pp. 100-110; 
Defendants' Exh. 7 at April 3, 2003 evidentiary hearing), which were all unrefutted by 
plaintiff. 
The district court also erred in awarding pre-judgment interest on the rent award. 
Pre-judgment interest is inappropriate to unfixed amounts such as fair rental value. Only 
damages that are "fixed as of a particular time" and that can be "calculated with 
mathematical accuracy, " and that can be "measured by facts and figures" are subject to 
pre-judgment interest. Biork v. April Indus., Inc. 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). "In 
particular, damages ascertained by determining the fair market value of real property 
../cannot be determined with mathematical precision, [and] may be inherently uncertain'" 
and are thus "far too uncertain to support a prejudgment interest award." Price-Orem v. 
Rollins. Brown & Gunnell 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah App. 1989). 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff Mardanlou should be reversed 
because the undisputed facts prove that the parties never agreed to share profits or control 
in Access Auto. That judgment should also be reversed on the ground that the plaintiffs 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The district court also erred by awarding 
rental value damages to plaintiff and with prejudgment interest. Accordingly, the 
defendants respectfully request that the district court's decision be reversed and judgment 
entered in their favor. 
Respectfully submitted this _|_ day of April, 2005. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
JAMES D. GILSON 
MARK L. CALLISTER 
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
HASSAN MARDANLOU, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ALI GHAFFARIAN, individually, 
NASRIN FAEZI, individually, 
ALI GHAFFARIAN and NASRIN FAEZI, 
dba ACCESS AUTO, 
Defendants• 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 980911308 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable L.A. Dever 
for trial. After hearing testimony from witnesses for both sides 
and argument of counsel, the Court made the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The lease/purchase agreement establishes that plaintiff 
and defendant Ali Ghaffarian entered into this agreement with 
lessor/seller Cline's Investments as either a partnership agreement 
or joint venture. 
2. The insurance document contains both plaintiff and 
defendant Ali Ghaffarian as insureds under the policy inferring a 
partnership. 
3. The insurance agent believed that the plaintiff and 
defendant Ali Ghaffarian were partners. 
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4. The Access Auto business card contains both names equally 
on the card. 
5. Defendant Ali Ghaffarian represented to his friend, 
Hashem Farr, that plaintiff and he were partners. 
6. Hashem Farr was present when defendant Ali Ghaffarian was 
confronted by plaintiff regarding that the Access Auto real 
property was purchased only in defendant Ali Ghaffarian's name and 
Hashem Farr heard defendant Ali Ghaffarian state to plaintiff, 
"Don't worry, we're partners." 
7. There was a division of labor between plaintiff and 
defendant Ali Ghaffarian. 
8. Plaintiff purchased the furniture used in the business of 
Access Auto, indicating he viewed Access Auto, the business, as a 
partnership. 
9* Plaintiff purchased the business cards for the business, 
indicating he viewed Access Auto, the business, as a partnership. 
10. The salaries for two of Access Auto's employees were paid 
by plaintiff, indicating he viewed Access Auto, the business, as a 
partnership. 
11. Defendant Ali Ghaffarian represented to plaintiff that 
he was the only other member of Access Auto besides plaintiff. 
12. Defendant Ali Ghaffarian signed the doing business as 
Access Auto prior to the association of plaintiff in only his name. 
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13. Defendant Ali Ghaffarian filed the tax returns for Access 
Auto only in his name. 
14. The mortgage on his property was paid for by the proceeds 
from the business, Access Auto, run by plaintiff and defendant Ali 
Ghaffarian. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. As a matter of law, plaintiff and defendant Ali 
Ghaffarian were partners. 
2. Defendants are estopped from claiming that there were 
additional partners besides plaintiff and Ali Ghaffarian, due to 
the representations and acts of defendant Ali Ghaffarian that he 
was the sole proprietor of Access Auto, prior to the partnership 
between plaintiff and defendant Ali Ghaffarian. 
3. Defendant Ali Ghaffarian would be guilty of committing 
fraud by claiming his wife was a partner due to his prior actions 
and representations. 
4. Defendant Ali Ghaffarian appropriated the partnership 
real property by placing it solely in his name. 
5. The plaintiff has been damaged. 
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6. The damages in this case are one-half of the real 
property of Access Auto situated at 3960-3964 S. State Street, 
subject to the allocation of remaining debt on the property. 
Dated this \ day of February, 2003. 
L. A.\j5j&fef*^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following, this ^) day of February, 2003: 
J. Kent Holland 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
623 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
Robert L. Booker 
Attorney for Defendants 
23 0 West 200 South, Suite 2410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HASSAN MARDANLOU 
Plaintiff, 
: SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 980911308 
vs. 
ACCESS AUTO, et al., 
Defendant. 
Following an April 3, 2003 evidentiary hearing, this Court 
requested and received further briefing regarding the subject of 
that hearing. The proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
together with the memoranda requested were submitted for decision 
on May 20, 2003. The following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are to be read in conjunction with this Court's Memorandum 
Decision of even date, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law filed in this matter on February 4, 2003. Based upon the 
evidence received at the April 3, 2003 hearing, and the arguments 
of the parties, the Court finds: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. All of the proceeds from the two loans secured against 
the property (the Small Business Administration Loan and the First 
,AN-7* 
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Security Bank Loan ("the mortgage loans") were for the purchase of 
the property, which was the primary asset of the partnership. 
2. As of November 7, 1997, the principal balance owing on 
the mortgage loans was $211,722.24. 
3. The outstanding principal balance on the mortgage loans 
on March 30, 2003 was $26,631.01. 
4. From November 7, 1997 through March 2 003, Defendants 
have made $237,464.09 in principal and interest payments on the 
mortgage loans. 
5. From November 7, 1997 through April 3, 2 003 Defendants 
have paid $26,977.23 in property taxes on the property, and 
$3,03 6.46 to insure the property. 
6. Between November 7, 1997 and March 2 003, Defendants 
made improvements to lots 18 and 19 valuing $162,300.00. The Court 
finds that $12,124.00 of the canal work should be attributed to the 
Marathon property, noted at lot 19 on defendant's exhibit, thereby 
reducing the value of improvements to the subject property to 
$150,176.00. 
7. The total amount advanced by defendants in either cash 
or value added since November 7, 1997 through March 2003 is 
$417,653.78. One half of this amount is $208,826.89. 
8. A reasonable amount of interest accruing on the amounts 
expended by defendants is 8%, calculated simply from the date of 
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expenditure. The interest only applies to % of the amounts 
expended by the defendants 
9. The reasonable annual rental value for the property is 
$83,500. One half the reasonable rental value of the property for 
5M years is $229,625. The plaintiff is also entitled to 8% 
interest on his M share of the rent from the first day of each 
month during the 5M year period. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendants are entitled to receive as an offset to 
plaintifffs award of one-half interest in the partnership property, 
one-half of all mortgage payments, one-half of the insurance 
payments, one-half of the property tax payments from November 7, 
1997 to the present. 
2. Defendants are entitled to receive as an additional 
offset to plaintifffs award of one-half interest in the property, 
one-half of the value of the improvements made to the property from 
November 7, 1997 to the present. 
3. Defendants are entitled to receive interest at 8%, 
accruing simply from the date of the expenditure or the 
improvement, on the amounts identified above. Plaintiff is 
entitled to receive interest at 8%, accruing simply each month on 
MARDANLOU V. GHAFFARIAN PAGE 4 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
the rental value due, as identified above. 
4. Defendants remain entitled to one-half of the amounts 
expended from April 3, 2003, through the date of amended judgment, 
which shall include a calculation of the interest accruing simply 
at 8% from the time of the expenditure or the improvement through 
•the date of Judgment. 
5. Plaintiff remains entitled to one-half the rental value 
of the property from May 7, 2003, forward, plus interest accruing 
simply at 8% from the first day of each month until paid. 
Attorney for Defendant is hereby requested to prepare a 
judgment consistent with these findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, as well as the Court's 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be sent 
by United States Mail, on the 2Q^ day of July, 2003, to the 
following: 
J. Kent Holland 
623 Eas t 1 s t Sou th 
P .O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
James D. Gilson 
10 East South Temple, Ste 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HASSAN MARDANLOU, : ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO, 980911308 
vs. : 
ALI GHAFFARIAN, individually, : 
NASRIN FAEZI, individually, 
ALI GHAFFARIAN and NASRIN FAEZI, : 
dba ACCESS AUTO, 
: 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on February 25, 2004, on 
defendants' Objections to the Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Findings which were issued July 22, 2003. 
The Court has considered the Objections of the defendants and 
rules as follows;. 
1- The amount of taxes paid was $42,389.69 and not 
$26,977.23 as previously determined by the Court. Defendants are 
entitled to an offset of one-half of the actual taxes paid. 
2. The Court based its decision on the value of the 
improvements on the testimony at trial. The testimony was clear 
that the Marathon property, not owned by the plaintiff, received a 
benefit from the improvements. The amount determined to be a 
benefit to the Marathon property was deducted from the claim of the 
defendants and will not be revisited by the Court. 
* i n — i 
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3 . The interest rate used by the Court was that suggested by 
the defendants' expert. The Court will revise the interest rate to 
comply with the statute: 10% prejudgment and 3.38% post-judgment. 
4, The Court's decision in awarding pre-post Judgment to 
plaintiff and against defendants is reaffirmed. 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to draft the final Judgment in 
compliance with this Order. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order, to the following, this /sU day of April, 2004: 
J. Kent Holland 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
623 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
James D. Gilson 
Attorney for Defendants 
10 E. South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
1 ISs~ <A t c « *-.EnA.Fi*.. 
_
 l , TOST COliT 
James D. Gilson (5472) 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH «y— 
10 East South Temple, Suite 900 ».*,*/» ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 ' ^ A G F D 
Telephone: (801)530-7300 LJ 
Facsimile: (801) 364-9127 
SALT U i E CUJWTY 
( ^ 
Deputy Clerk 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
HASSAN MARDANLOU, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALIGHAFFARIAN, individually; NASRIN 
FAEZI-GHAFFARIAN; ALI GHAFFARIAN 
and NASRIN FAEZI-GHAFFARIAN, dba 
ACCESS AUTO, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 980911308 
Honorable L.A. Dever 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable L.A. Dever for trial on October 16, 
17, and 18,2002. On October 18, 2002, the court announced its findings and conclusions from 
the bench. Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a non-final Judgment was 
entered by the Court on February 4, 2003. An evidentiary hearing was held by the Court on April 
3,2003 pursuant to defendants' Motion for Limited New Trial. After hearing the evidence at 
that hearing, and having reviewed the post-hearing memoranda by the parties, on July 22,2003 
the Court issued Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Memorandum 
JD16342014 
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Decision and Order, after which the Defendants filed a Motion to Amend and Objections on 
August 13,2003. A hearing on the Defendants' Motion and Objections was held on February 25, 
2004, which Motion the court granted in part and denied in part by its Order dated April 20, 
2004. Pursuant thereto, the Court's February 4,2003 Judgment is hereby amended to state as 
follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that Defendants shall 
transfer by deed to the Plaintiff Hassan Mardanlou an undivided one-half interest in the real 
property known as Access Auto, situated at 3960-3964 S. State Street in Salt Lake County (the 
"Property"). Such interest shall be subject to an equitable lien in favor of Defendants, securing 
the obligation of Plaintiff to pay Defendants one-half the $663,414.90 amount that Defendants 
advanced towards the Property (for mortgage payments, insurance, property taxes, 
improvements, and interest on such advances at 10% per annum) from November 7,1997 
through June 14,2004, plus simple interest on that amount at the rate of 10% per annum from 
June 14,2004 until the date hereof, and thereafter at the rate of 3.29% (Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-
4(3)(a)), until paid. Plaintiffs one-half interest in the Property is also subject to the existing 
mortgage lien arising from the outstanding SBA loan for the Property. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that Defendants' interest 
in the Property is subject to an equitable lien in favor of the plaintiff, securing the obligation of 
Defendants to pay Plaintiff one-half the court-determined $83,500 annual rental value of the 
Property, pro-rated each month for the period November 7,1997 until the date hereof, plus 
simple interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the first day of each month during this period, 
and thereafter at the rate of 3.29% (Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(3)(a)), until paid. 
2 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any and all remaining claims in this action are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
D a t e d ^ ^ ^ W l H VI,2004. 
mi picjuuiuc. 
' S f w ^ 
DISTMCT C^URT JUDG^L 
Approved as to form: 
J. Kent Holland 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Juries D. Gilson ' 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true copy of the foregoing [proposed] AMENDED 
JUDGMENT to be mailed on July /&_, 2004 to the following: 
J. Kent Holland 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
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